Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law
Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship

1988

From the Bankruptcy Courts: Release of Standby
Letter of Credit as a Defense to a Preference Action
Benjamin Weintraub
Alan N. Resnick
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Benjamin Weintraub and Alan N. Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts: Release of Standby Letter of Credit as a Defense to a Preference
Action, 21 UCC L.J. 183 (1988)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/832

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Widntraub* and Alan N. Resnick**
RELEASE OF STANDBY LETTER
OF CREDIT AS A DEFENSE TO A
PREFERENCE ACTION

The standby letter of credit is a
common device used by credit
executives to assure that payment
of a financiai obligation will be
forthcoming. However, a recent
decision of the Court' of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit demonstrates
how the benefits of having a
standby letter of credit goes well
beyond the assurance that payment will be received. In In re
Fuel Oil Supply & Terminating,
Inc., 1 the release of a standby letter of credit upon prebankruptcy
performance of the underlying obligation was subsequently relied
on to protect a transfer from attack as a voidable preference
under Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code.

* Counsel to the law firm of Levin &
Weintraub & Crames, New York City;
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
•• Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra
University School of Law, Hempstead,
New York; Counsel to the law firm
Berkman, Henoch, Peterson, Kadin &
Peddy, Garden City, New York; member
of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
' 837 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988).

Exchange Agreement
On May 6, 1981, Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf) and Fuel Oil Supply & Terminaling, Inc. (FOSTI),
entered into an exchange agreement (Exchange Agreement) by
which Gulf agreed to transfer to
FOSTI a total of 200,000 barrels of gasoline in the Colonial
Pipeline at Pasadena, Texas, and
FOSTI agreed to transfer to Gulf
the same quantity of gasoline at a
certain time later that year. In addition, FOSTI agteed to pay Gulf
a $0.01 per gallon "handling differential" for each thirty-day period on gasoline delivered by
Gulf. This type of exchange transaction is a mechanism that is
commonly used by oil companies
to increase efficiency and minimize transportation ·costs when
each oil company owns crude oil
and operates refineries located in
different places. The exchange
enables each company to obtain
crude oil at a location that is
closer to its own refinery.
The Exchange Agreement also
required FOSTI to provide Gulf
with a letter of credit on the outstanding balances. FOSTI procured a standby letter of credit
from each of two banks which
named Gulf as beneficiary and
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which fully secured FOSTI' s obligations to Gulf. FOSTI gave the
banks security interests in collateral which was, at all times, equal
to or in excess of the face value of
the letters of credit. Describing
the way in which a letter of credit
operates, the court stated: "Under a standby letter of credit,
the bank becomes primarily liable
to the beneficiary upon the default
of the bank's customer to pay for
the goods or services. . . . The
shifting of liability to the bank
rather than to the services or
goods provider is the main purpose of the letter of credit." 2
The performance of the terms
of the Exchange Agreement with
slight alterations of time and location commenced with Gulf delivering approximately 200,000 barrels of gasoline to FOSTI in May
and June of 1981. FOSTI paid Gulf
a sum of money as a "place and
term differential." In July and
August of the same year, FOSTI
performed its end of the bargain
by delivering
approximately
200,000 barrels of gasoline to Gulf
and by sending Gulf a check
for the "handling differential."
Since FOSTI fully performed the
agreement,. on August 4 Gulf cancelled one of the letters of credit
and the other one expired on
August 31.
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Bankruptcy Case Filed
On September 4, 1981, an involuntary petition under chapter 7
of the Bankruptcy Code was filed
against FOSTI and the case was
converted to chapter 11 one
month later. As debtor in possession, FOSTI commenced an action against Gulf to recover the
value of the gasoline that FOSTI
delivered to Gulf plus the differential charges paid to Gulf, alleging
that these transfers were voidable
preferences under Section 547 of
the Code. In turn, Gulf filed a
third-party complaint against the
banks seeking reinstatement of
the letters of credit and indemnity.

Bailment Not Sale

All parties moved for summary
judgment. The bankruptcy court
granted the banks' and FOSTI's
motions and denied Gulf's motion. The district court affirmed
insofar as it pertained to the banks
but vacated the bankruptcy
court'sjudgment as it pertained to
FOSTI. The district court held
that with respect to the gasoline
transfers, the Exchange Agreement created a bailment, not a
sale, ·and, accordingly, there was
no antecedent debt unqer Section
547(b)(2). In essence, the district
court reasoned that no debt is
created by a bailment. The district
court, in analyzing the differential
l /d. at 225 n.2 (quoting In re Compton
payments, held that the release of
Corp., 831 F.2d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 1987)).
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the letters of credit by Gulf did not
provide FOSTI with "new value"
to constitute a defense under Section 547(c)(l).
The court of appeals <\eclined to
resolve the question whether t!le
exchange transaction was, a bailment; regardless of whether the
elements of a preference set forth
in Section 547(b) are present, "we
find that the elements of section
547(c)(l) are satisfied by the
tripartite relationship between
FOSTI, Gulf and the Banks." 3

Section 547. Section 547(c)(l)
provides:
The trustee may not avoid under
this section a transfer(!) to the extent that such transfer was
(A) intended by the debtor
and the creditor to or for
whos~ benefit such transfer
was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new
value given to the debtor;
and
(B) in fact a substantially
contemporaneous exchange.

The term "new vatue" is defined in Section 547(a)(2) to inThe court stated that the pur- clude the "release by a transferee
pose of Section 547 was to serve of property previously transferred
two congressional goals. "First, to such transferee in a transaction
by bringing back into the -debtor's that is neither void nor voidable
estate certain transfers made by the debtor or the trustee under
shortly before the filing of the any applicable law. . . . '' As an
bankruptcy petition, it creates a illustration, the court described a
disincentive for creditors to attack situation in which a creditor takes
a financially unstable debtor. Sec- a perfected security interest in the
ond, it promotes equality among debtor's collateral and, within
unsecured creditors by forcing ninety days prior to bankruptcy,
these creditors to share the debt- releases that security interest upon
or's unencumbered assets on a the debtor's performance of its
pro rata· basis." 4 The court em- obligation. "This outcome is conphasized, however, that "these sistent with the principle underlyconcerns apply to a lesser degree ing§ 547(c)(l) because the release
to creditors with fully secured of the debtor's' collateral offsets
the transfer to the creditor,
claims. " 5
Section 547(c) exempts from thereby resulting in no dep}etion
the trustee's avoidance power to the debtor's estate." 6
certain preferential transfers that
Instead of taking a security
do not further the twin goals of interest in FOSTI's assets, Gulf
Purposes of Act Met

3

/d. at 227.

4Jd.
5

6

ld.
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was named as beneficiary on the
two letters of credit issued by the
banks. The banks held the security interests in FOSTI' s assets,
not Gulf. When FOSTI transferred gasoline and money to
Gulf, Gulf did not release any collateral owned by FOSTI and,
FOSTI argued, Gulf gave no new
value. The releases of the collateral were by the banks, not by
Gulf. Nonetheless, Gulf contended that the requirements of
Section 547(c)(l) were met by the
"tripartite relationship." That is,
in response to POST!' s performance, Gulf released the letters of
credit and the banks released
FOSTI's collateral, thereby· providing FOSTI with new value.
FOSTI did not dispute Gulf's contention that the exchange was
contemporaneous and that the
parties intended that the performance by FOSTI would result in
the -banks' contemporaneous
release of the collateral. FOSTI
relied on the argument that the
requirements of Section 547(c)(l)
were not satisfied because the
banks, not Gulf, gave new value
to FOSTI.
Independence Principle
The district court held that
when there is a letter of credit, the
relationship between the issuing
bank and its customer (the debtor)
and the relationship between the
bank and the receiver of the letter
of credit (the creditor) are legally
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irrelevant to the analysis of the
relationship between the debtor
and the creditor. The district
court based its holding on the
proposition set forth in In re
Originala Petroleum Corp. 7 that
letters of credit involve three
separate and independent relationships. The district court concluded, therefore, that new value
must be given directly to the
debtor (FOSTI) by the creditor
who received the prepetition
transfer (Gulf) in order for Section 547(c)(l) to apply.
Risk Allocation
The court of appeals disagreed
with the district court's reliance
on the principle set forth in Originala. Although the arrangement
between the banks, the debtor and
the creditor were substantially
the same, in Originala the debtor
failed to perform its obligation
prior to bankruptcy and the issue
was whether the creditor could be
enjoined from drawing on the letter of credit. The court in Originala noted that letters of credit
serve to shift the risk of nonperformance to the banks and, therefore, it refused to issue an injunction because to do so would upset
that risk allocation:
The independence principle preserves the allocation of risk to the
issuing bank by requiring the issu7 39 Bankr. 1003 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1984).
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ing bank to honor a draw request
notwithstanding a- dispute between
the customer and the beneficiary as
to an alleged breach of the underlying contract. Letter of credit financing will cease to be a viable component of finance ~orld-wide unless
the independence principle [is] preserved.8

The court of appeals in Fuel Oil
Supply distinguished Originala by
noting that FOSTI did not seek to
prevent Gulf from drawing on the
letters of credit, but instead was
seeking to recover transfers it
made to Gulf for which it received
new value in the form of released
collateral. "On these facts, the
independence principle would not
be compromised by a ruling in
favor of Gulf because FOSTI' s
pre-bankruptcy performance effectively absolved the Banks of liability. " 9

ruptcy petition Gulf would have
drawn on the letters of credit and
the banks would have been entitled to the collateral. "Therefore,
permitting FOSTI to recover the
value of its transfers to Gulf
would serve neither of the goals
which animate the preference section . . . . The exchange did not
result in a depletion of FOSTI's
estate, and therefore FOSTI's unsecured creditors were not impaired by this transaction." 10
Focusing on the banks' right to
the collateral as a disincentive for
the banks to unfairly compel
FOSTI to perform, the court recognized that the filing of a bankruptcy petition could have an
adverse impact on the banks''
position. The court stated in a
footnote:
This is not to say that the banks
would have been entitled to immediately foreclose on the collateral.
While section 362, the automatic
stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362,
would have prevented the Banks
from taking immediate action, the
Banks, as creditors with fully secured claims, would have eventually received the value of their
claims. Delay in payment is one
risk that the Banks assume by issuing letters of credit. [Emphasis
added.] 11

Purposes of Legislation

Returning to the congressional purposes underlying Section
547(c)(l), the court of appeals observed that the letters of credit assured Gulf full payment upon
FOSTI's faih,1re to perform, and
the collateral backing the letters
of credit secured the bank. Since
both were fully protected, neither
had significant incentive to unfairly force FOSTI to perform.
Assuming that FOSTI had not
performed, upon filing the bank-

Although the court did not mention other provisions of the Bank-

a Id. at 1008.
9 837 F.2d at 229.

10
11
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ruptcy Code that could further
the delay of the banks' realization
of the collateral in the event of
FOSTI's defal!lt, another cause of
delay is that the debtot in chapter
11 may continue to use the collateral under Section 363 provided
that the banks are adequately protected in accordance with Section
361.
It is interesting to note that the
court of appeals assumed that the
banks' security interests were
properly perfected.
Typically, banks enter arrangements with their business customers whereby the banks provide
financing in exchange for a promissory note and a security agre,ement
with a future advances provision.
... The security agreement is perfected by the filing of a financing
statement .... There is nothing in
the record to indicate that the relationship between the Banks and
FOSTI deviated from the typical
arrangement. 12
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trustee or debtor in possession the
status of a hypothetical judicial
lien creditor. In that event, the
collateral would have become
property of the estate free of any
Ilens. Therefore, the banks' release of unperfected security
interests upon FOSTI's prepetition performance would not have
had any impact upon the estate
and could 1\0t have constituted
new value. Consistent with tlris
analysis, Section 547(a)(2) provides that "new value" includes
the release of property previously
transferred to the transferee "in a
transaction that is neither void nor
voidable by the debtor of the
trus,tee .... " Accordingly, if the
banks' security interests were not
perfected, making them voidable
under Section 544(a)(l), the release of the collateral could not
constitute "new value" for Section 547(c)(l) purposes.
Cobclusion

Perfection of Security Interests
Assumed
The assumption that the banks'
security interests were perfected
is critical to the court's decision.
If the security interests were onperfected, they would have been
voidable in bankruptcy pursuant
to Section 544(a)(l), the so-called
strong-arm clause that gives the

12

Id. at 228 n.ll.

The decision in Fuel Oil Supply
does not mean that the existence
of a standby letter of credit will
always be the basis of a Section
547(c)(l) defense to a preference
action. The reasoning of the court
of appeals is limited to si~uations
where the letter of credit is secured by an unavoidable perfected security interest that was
released upon per:formance of the
underlying obligation. Moreover,
if the letter of credit is secured by
a lien on the debtor's assets and
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was issued within -the preference
period for the purpose of protect·
ing an otherwise unsecured creditor on a preexisting debt, the
tripartite transaction may be
viewed as preferential and may be
avoided. 13

13 See In re Compton Corp., S31 F.2d
586 (5th Cir. 1987), op. on reh'g, 835 F.2d
584 (5th Cir. 1~88); see also B. Weintraub
& A. Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual
~ 7.05[12] (1988 Supp.); Weintraub &
Resnick, "Enforceability of Letters of
Credit When the Customer Is in Bankruptcy: From Twist Cap to Air Conditioning,"
20 U.C.C. L.J. 96 (1987).
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